The U.S. Navy’s top officer provided further details Tuesday on the service’s Hedge Strategy, specifically on the “tailored forces” and “tailored offsets” portion of the strategy.
The tailored forces and offsets are flexible groupings of manned and unmanned platforms, autonomous systems, and logistics nodes built to address high-consequence but low-probability missions.
Unveiled last month, the Hedge Strategy aims to pair unmanned systems with traditional forces and expand the fleet’s ability to respond to unpredictable crises.
“These are situations too consequential to ignore but too unlikely to drive our overall fleet design,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said at the AFCEA West 2026 conference in San Diego.
Caudle said the “tailored forces” and “tailored offsets” are key to the strategy and allow the Navy to “hedge” against various threats without constraining overall fleet design.
Examples of tailored offsets include expendable or attritable surface vessels used for scouting, screening, or strike missions, as well as unmanned underwater vehicles for area denial and counter-mine operations. Low-cost drone interceptors are also part of the plan and provide a scalable way to counter emerging aerial threats.
Tailored forces combine multiple tailored offsets to address specific missions in particular regions. They may include traditional platforms such as surface combatants, patrol aircraft, and submarines for command, control, and deployment.
“Tailored forces and tailored offsets are scalable formations that manage risk, expand mass, multiply response options, and preserve our combat advantage,” he said.
The Hedge Strategy also integrates with the Navy’s global maritime response plan and combat surge readiness programs, enabling forces to respond quickly to emergent crises anywhere in the world. Every tailored capability is designed to complement the main fleet, allowing manned and unmanned assets to work together seamlessly.
He described the approach as a balance of fiscal, industrial, and operational realities, providing cost-effective, scalable solutions while maintaining advanced multi-mission platforms.
Drones are also a critical part of the Navy’s “hedging approach.” According to Caudle, their role is both offense and defense. Counter-drone capabilities and low-cost offensive drones are intended to amplify the main battle force, providing “lethal outputs that are scalable, deployable, adaptable, and, perhaps most importantly, cost-effective,” he said.
Caudle called on industry partners, including traditional defense contractors and newer technology firms, to accelerate development and deployment of these systems.
Caudle said the strategy formalizes and expands a concept that has long existed within the Navy’s force structure.
Special operations forces, which make up less than 2% of the Navy, serve as the nation’s hedge against low-intensity and irregular warfare. Ballistic missile submarines, comprising less than 6% of the force, act as a deterrent against strategic attacks.
Rather than introducing an entirely new framework, he described it as an evolution of how the service already manages risk across different threat levels.
“Building a fleet to cover every pressing scenario is not only cost and risk prohibitive, but a disservice to the taxpayer and less effective operationally,” he said. “What hedge strategy avoids is a brittle, single-purpose force, either overbuilt for the high-end fight and underused day-to-day, or optimized for low-end crises and overmatched when it counts.”
The Navy plans to continue refining the hedge strategy over the coming years, integrating lessons from exercises and field deployments to improve the speed, flexibility, and lethality of tailored forces.
The goal, Caudle said, is a fleet that can “learn, adapt, and combat our adversaries” while remaining cost-conscious and operationally ready.